1. Recent turmoil in North Africa and the Middle East has contributed to a sharp rise in oil prices and raised uncertainty about where they are headed.
    • Since completing our last forecast (February 4), nearby oil futures, specifically their average for the second quarter of this year, have risen roughly $7 per barrel.
    • With the possibility that the political turmoil could spread to other key oil-producing nations, the range of outcomes with respect to oil prices is now very wide.
    • More extreme geopolitical angst in the region would also generate adverse spillovers to financial markets, some of which are already evident. The Alternative Scenarios that we produced last summer and which explored surging oil prices and financial market spillovers (related to tightening sanctions and potential conflict involving Iran) may also shed light on the evolving situation, especially if it spins further out of control. 
    The macroeconomic effects of rising oil prices depend on the source, the magnitude and the duration of the increase.
    • We like to distinguish between a rise in oil prices that is the result of actual or expected restrictions on supply — a supply shock — and a rise which is due to unexpectedly strong demand — a demand shock.
    • A supply-shock induced rise in oil prices reduces real economic activity primarily through an erosion of real incomes of consumers of energy goods and services and the subsequent weakening of aggregate demand, and also can impact productive efficiency through the resulting change in the relative price of inputs.
    • With a demand-shock induced increase in oil prices, the rise is driven by an acceleration in aggregate demand. This acceleration in demand is a positive impulse for GDP growth that is only partially offset by the induced rise in energy prices. 
    • Up until recently, the rise in oil and other commodity prices has been driven primarily by the strengthening rebound in global aggregate demand — a demand shock. Now, on top of that, we have a threat of a significant cutback in supply.
    • It goes without saying that the bigger the magnitude of the energy price shock, the larger will be the initial erosion of real income, aggregate demand and GDP.
    • The greater the duration of the energy price shock, the longer will be sustained those real effects. Moreover, a price spike that is not quickly reversed might also cause long-term inflation expectations to become unanchored. An upward drift in inflation expectations might then require a tightening of monetary policy to prevent a pass through of the energy price shock to the wage-price nexus. 
    It’s not just the oil price rise that matters! Oil price shocks historically have been associated with an increase in geopolitical risks affecting oil-producing countries, with significant spillovers to financial markets.
    • Rising geopolitical risks and an accompanying pullback from risk taking is then reflected in the decline in the prices of risk assets, especially equity prices.
    • The resulting tightening of financial conditions can significantly augment the adverse direct effect of higher oil prices on growth.
    • To be sure, ignoring the financial market spillover may significantly understate the macro effects of the developments today in North Africa and the Middle East.
    Nevertheless, the macro effects of an increase in oil prices of the supply-shock variety that we are now experiencing is an important part of the story, and knowing the partial effects of the rise in energy prices can still be helpful in assessing the full adverse impact on growth.

    Assuming no change in long-term inflation expectations, no monetary policy response, and no financial-market spillovers, the partial effects of the rise in oil prices can be estimated by scaling up or down the following simulation result generated from our model.

    An increase in oil prices of $10/bbl for one year starting in the first quarter of 2011 would:
    • Reduce GDP growth by about 0.3 percentage point over the first half of the year and by 0.2 percentage point over the entire year. 
    • Headline PCE inflation would be about 0.1 percentage point higher over the year, and the unemployment rate about 0.1 percentage point higher.
    If we instead factor in the rise in oil and petroleum product prices that has occurred since we published last month’s forecast, including the narrowing differential to last month’s prices as currently implied by futures, we find that GDP growth would be about 0.2 percentage point slower this year, but 0.1 percentage point faster in 2012. See Table 1 below.

    Core PCE inflation would be unaffected in both years.

    These results are quite similar to those seen in the case of a sustained $10 rise in prices reported above, despite a smaller rise in crude oil prices, due to the more than proportional rise in gasoline prices and futures that has occurred since the last forecast.

    These results are suggestive of the revisions likely to our forecast in this upcoming round, but since other things have also changed — stock prices and interest rates, to name a couple — the change in the forecast remains to be seen.

    Nevertheless, these results suggest that if the energy futures markets have the extent and magnitude of the crisis in North Africa and the Middle East properly gauged, the economic fallout for the U.S. is likely to be relatively modest.

    An important caveat is that the simulations reported here assume that product prices, the prices that really matter, will move proportionally with crude prices. However, since the shift toward diesel fuel consumption in Europe has put a premium on light sweet crudes, the relationships among the prices of oil of varying qualities has changed dramatically of late. As a result, the relationship between any particular crude price and product prices has also broken down. This fact puts a somewhat larger confidence interval around these results than would be the case if these prices were more or less moving together as they have historically, over most periods.

    We will issue a more extensive alternative scenario next week that will incorporate a significantly higher path of oil prices and related financial-market spillovers after the completion of our forecast update…stay tuned.

    See also 



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  2. December and January were unusually cold.

    • We construct a measure of unusual temperatures by using data on heating degree days and cooling degree days and comparing them to their recent norms.

    • By this measure, both December and January were more than 1½ standard deviations colder than normal.

    We have found a significant role for unusual temperatures in explaining near-term movements in GDP.

    • Unusually warm temperatures boost GDP, while unusually cool temperatures lower GDP.

    Our model that links unusual temperatures to GDP suggests that unseasonably cold temperatures in December and January will subtract noticeably from first-quarter GDP growth.

    • We simulated the equation twice: first using actual temperatures through January and assuming normal temperatures in February and March, and second assuming a counterfactual case of normal temperatures from December through March.

    • The difference between these two simulations yields an estimate of the effect on Q4 and Q1 GDP growth.

    Because the underlying link in our model is between unusual temperatures and the level of GDP, if temperatures return to and stay at normal, GDP growth will be boosted in the second quarter by roughly the same amount it was restrained in the first quarter. This is probably an underappreciated part of the Q1 weather story.



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  3. We expect a moderate upshift in rent inflation as part of a broad recovery, but we do not expect that the upswing in rents will add substantially to core PCE inflation in the near future.

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  4. Monthly GDP rose 1.0% in December, more than reversing a 0.5% decline in November, and continuing the uneven, but robustly rising trend exhibited over the last several months. Two-thirds of the increase in December was accounted for by a sharp increase in nonfarm inventory investment. An increase in final sales in December reflected gains in PCE and spending on capital goods, partially offset by a small decline in net exports. The level of monthly GDP in December was 2.0% above the fourth-quarter average at an annual rate. Our latest tracking forecast of 3.5% growth of GDP in the first quarter assumes average monthly increases of 0.3% per month during the first quarter.

    The full report on December monthly GDP and the historical data is available for download in the Public Reading Room of our website.



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  5. Our estimate of the macro effects of LSAPs II is lower than reported in two studies by staff in the Federal Reserve System. Nonetheless, all three studies suggest that the macro effects of $600 billion of asset purchases are modest.

    This is from a longer commentary, published on February 7, 2011, that is part of MA's Monetary Policy Insights Service.

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  6. Today’s Employment Situation showed a lackluster gain of 36 thousand in payroll employment that was well below the consensus estimate, a huge increase in household employment (after adjusting for January’s population controls), a surprising and large drop in the unemployment rate (from 9.4% to 9.0%), and a slight dip in the labor force participation rate. It also included benchmark revisions. What does it all mean?

    • Bad weather probably restrained January’s rise in payroll employment by roughly 80 thousand. This will be reversed next month unless there is more bad weather.

    • Newly applied population controls distorted January’s numbers for changes in population, employment, and the labor force, but not the levels of the unemployment rate or the participation rate. Allowing for the controls, civilian employment surged 589 thousand.

    • Part of the surprising decline in unemployment is likely to be reversed. Still, the unemployment rate is well below our forecast of only a month ago, suggesting an upward revision — albeit only a small one — to our forecast of inflation.

    • With unemployment lower and falling faster than expected, and the forecast for inflation thus subject to upward revision, our call that the Fed’s exit from its near-zero interest rate policy will be “early,” specifically at the first FOMC meeting in 2012, is reinforced.

    • As expected, benchmark revisions to employment and hours were downward but not by enough to alter our estimates of trend growth much, if at all.

    WEATHER EFFECTS
    We estimate that adverse weather suppressed January’s rise in employment by roughly 80 thousand, and expect a reversal of this magnitude in February unless there is more unusually bad weather. To arrive at this estimate we take from the Household Survey the number of persons not at work due to bad weather (which surged from 196 thousand in December to 916 thousand in January), scale it by civilian employment, seasonally adjust that, and then include its change in a time-series model for the monthly change in establishment employment. This methodology suggests that bad weather may have reduced the change in establishment employment by about 80 thousand in January (with a 1-standard error range of roughly 40 thousand to 120 thousand). Note that the ADP estimate of the change in private payroll employment for January (which was 187 thousand) is not significantly affected by weather because the ADP data capture people on payrolls even if they cannot actually make it to work.

    POPULATION CONTROLS
    Annual population controls had little, if any, effect on either the reported unemployment or participation rates, but to the extent there may have been such effects they will not be reversed. In contrast, the new population controls contributed to changes in population, the labor force, and employment in January that muddied the interpretation of these numbers. However, after adjusting for the effects of the controls, the report showed a typical rise in population, no change in the labor force, and a huge increase in civilian employment of 589 thousand.

    EMPLOYMENT CROSS CURRENTS
    Growth of establishment employment the last two months has been somewhat disappointing, growth of employment in the household survey has been stunningly strong, and growth of payroll employment as measured in the ADP National Employment Report has been in-between but above expectations. It really is hard to know what to make of this, but we do have a sense that payroll employment has sometimes lagged household employment during recoveries, only to be revised up subsequently. In addition, we do suspect that January’s number was restrained by bad weather. Hence, we do not want to over-react to it. Therefore, except for the reversal of January’s weather effects, we will not change our projection of employment growth much as a result of today’s figures.

    THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE / INFLATION
    In contrast to disappointing employment growth, the unemployment rate declined sharply and unexpectedly from 9.4% in December to 9.0% in January, and has fallen 0.8 percentage point over the last two months. We believe this is running a little ahead of the game. As we work to complete our forecast, we will assume a partial reversal of January’s decline, so that our final print likely will show an average unemployment rate in the first quarter of 9.1% or 9.2%. Nevertheless, this is almost ¾ percentage point lower than the 9.8% we showed last month. Given the role of labor-market slack in our model for core inflation, this argues for an upward revision to our inflation forecast of a tenth or two over the short-run forecast

    MONETARY POLICY IMPLICATIONS
    With unemployment lower and falling faster than expected, and the forecast for inflation thus subject to upward revision, our call that the Fed’s exit from its near-zero interest rate policy will be “early,” specifically at the first FOMC meeting in 2012, is reinforced.

    BENCHMARK REVISIONS / TREND GROWTH
    The report reflected the annual benchmarking of the establishment survey to the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) for March of 2010. The revisions were downward by an amount that grew unevenly to 483 thousand (or 0.4%) by the end of 2010. As the BLS had already previewed these revisions, they were not a surprise.

    These revisions will not be reflected in the official data on productivity and costs until the next official report out of the BLS in about 4 weeks. However, we can estimate fairly accurately that the growth of both productivity and hourly compensation will be revised up by roughly 0.2 percentage point per year over the last two years, with no impact on unit labor costs and hence no impact on inflation pressures from the cost side. Revisions to productivity of this magnitude are not likely to change our assessment of the economy’s trend rate of growth much, if at all, although our final assessment must await our processing of the official data in a few weeks.


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  7. A good part of the drama and suspense about today's press conference by Chairman Bernanke was about the press conference itself, not just the tone or substance of the Chairman's remarks. Still, there was "value added," a clarification of his message on the outlook.

    This is from a longer commentary, published on February 3, 2011, that is part of MA's Monetary Policy Insights Service.

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