- Since completing our last forecast (February 4), nearby oil futures, specifically their average for the second quarter of this year, have risen roughly $7 per barrel.
- With the possibility that the political turmoil could spread to other key oil-producing nations, the range of outcomes with respect to oil prices is now very wide.
- More extreme geopolitical angst in the region would also generate adverse spillovers to financial markets, some of which are already evident. The Alternative Scenarios that we produced last summer and which explored surging oil prices and financial market spillovers (related to tightening sanctions and potential conflict involving Iran) may also shed light on the evolving situation, especially if it spins further out of control.
- We like to distinguish between a rise in oil prices that is the result of actual or expected restrictions on supply — a supply shock — and a rise which is due to unexpectedly strong demand — a demand shock.
- A supply-shock induced rise in oil prices reduces real economic activity primarily through an erosion of real incomes of consumers of energy goods and services and the subsequent weakening of aggregate demand, and also can impact productive efficiency through the resulting change in the relative price of inputs.
- With a demand-shock induced increase in oil prices, the rise is driven by an acceleration in aggregate demand. This acceleration in demand is a positive impulse for GDP growth that is only partially offset by the induced rise in energy prices.
- Up until recently, the rise in oil and other commodity prices has been driven primarily by the strengthening rebound in global aggregate demand — a demand shock. Now, on top of that, we have a threat of a significant cutback in supply.
- It goes without saying that the bigger the magnitude of the energy price shock, the larger will be the initial erosion of real income, aggregate demand and GDP.
- The greater the duration of the energy price shock, the longer will be sustained those real effects. Moreover, a price spike that is not quickly reversed might also cause long-term inflation expectations to become unanchored. An upward drift in inflation expectations might then require a tightening of monetary policy to prevent a pass through of the energy price shock to the wage-price nexus.
- Rising geopolitical risks and an accompanying pullback from risk taking is then reflected in the decline in the prices of risk assets, especially equity prices.
- The resulting tightening of financial conditions can significantly augment the adverse direct effect of higher oil prices on growth.
- To be sure, ignoring the financial market spillover may significantly understate the macro effects of the developments today in North Africa and the Middle East.
Assuming no change in long-term inflation expectations, no monetary policy response, and no financial-market spillovers, the partial effects of the rise in oil prices can be estimated by scaling up or down the following simulation result generated from our model.
An increase in oil prices of $10/bbl for one year starting in the first quarter of 2011 would:
- Reduce GDP growth by about 0.3 percentage point over the first half of the year and by 0.2 percentage point over the entire year.
- Headline PCE inflation would be about 0.1 percentage point higher over the year, and the unemployment rate about 0.1 percentage point higher.
Core PCE inflation would be unaffected in both years.
These results are quite similar to those seen in the case of a sustained $10 rise in prices reported above, despite a smaller rise in crude oil prices, due to the more than proportional rise in gasoline prices and futures that has occurred since the last forecast.
These results are suggestive of the revisions likely to our forecast in this upcoming round, but since other things have also changed — stock prices and interest rates, to name a couple — the change in the forecast remains to be seen.
Nevertheless, these results suggest that if the energy futures markets have the extent and magnitude of the crisis in North Africa and the Middle East properly gauged, the economic fallout for the U.S. is likely to be relatively modest.
An important caveat is that the simulations reported here assume that product prices, the prices that really matter, will move proportionally with crude prices. However, since the shift toward diesel fuel consumption in Europe has put a premium on light sweet crudes, the relationships among the prices of oil of varying qualities has changed dramatically of late. As a result, the relationship between any particular crude price and product prices has also broken down. This fact puts a somewhat larger confidence interval around these results than would be the case if these prices were more or less moving together as they have historically, over most periods.
We will issue a more extensive alternative scenario next week that will incorporate a significantly higher path of oil prices and related financial-market spillovers after the completion of our forecast update…stay tuned.
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