1. The statement indicates that the Committee downgraded its forecast for growth, again. The question is whether the revision met the threshold for action.

    This is an excerpt from a longer commentary that is part of MA's Monetary Policy Insights Service.

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  2. After the August meeting, remarkably, members could not agree on whether or not the MBS reinvestment decision had anything to do with the Committee’s policy posture.

    This is an excerpt from a longer commentary that is part of MA's Monetary Policy Insights Service.

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  4. We held our 20th Annual Washington Policy Seminar in Washington, DC last Thursday. Economists and policymakers from notable institutions joined the MA team for a full day of conversation about fiscal and monetary policy. The central issue was balancing the need for short-term stimulus with longer-term risks and consequences.

    MA’s Senior Managing Director and Co-Founder Joel Prakken started the seminar by outlining the current fiscal situation and the macroeconomic consequences under two broad cases: a sustainable scenario and a “train wreck” scenario. Chris Varvares, MA’s Senior Managing Director and Co-Founder, expanded these themes by moderating a discussion on the economic and financial consequences of extremely large deficits. This panel consisted of Bill Gale, The Arjay and Frances Miller Chair in Federal Economic Policy at Brookings Institution, and John H. Burbank III, Chief Investment Officer at Passport Capital, LLC, who offered their views on how much mega-deficits could impair longer-term economic viability.

    Turning to the political context of deficit reduction, Chris invited Maya MacGuineas, President of Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget and Director of the Fiscal Policy Program at the New America Foundation, and Keith Hennessey, Former Director of the National Economic Council, to discuss the political environment for deficit reduction efforts.

    The afternoon session began with a presentation by Jason Furman, Deputy Director of the National Economic Council and Deputy Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, who laid out the views from the Administration: “Medium-term Deficit Reduction at a Time of Short-Run Economic Challenge.” This was complemented by a presentation from Doug Elmendorf, Director of the Congressional Budget Office, who spoke about reconciling the trade-off between immediate fiscal stimulus and longer-term fiscal sustainability.

    The seminar concluded with a fascinating conversation between two monetary policy experts: MA’s Larry Meyer, Director of MA’s Monetary Policy Insights service and former Federal Reserve Governor, and Adam Posen, External Member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England and Senior Fellow at The Peterson Institute for International Economics. They started by comparing monetary policy conduct in the United States and the United Kingdom, and proceeded to have a spirited conversation, about quantitative easing, decision-making practices, and inflation dynamics.

    After the seminar, participants were invited to join us at a reception at our Washington, DC office.

    A video of the conference is available to MA clients.

    MA’s 109th Quarterly Outlook Meeting will be held on Wednesday, December 8 in Washington, DC. Keep checking this space for more details!

    Click here for more information to request an invitation for MA’s next conference.

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  5. Today, the NBER's Business Cycle Dating Committee declared that June 2009 marked the end of the recession that began in December 2007, referring to MA's Monthly GDP in its determination: "The committee ... places particular emphasis on measures that refer to the total economy rather than to particular sectors. These include a measure of monthly GDP that has been developed by the private forecasting firm Macroeconomic Advisers ... ."

    The statement also prominently placed MA's Monthly GDP at the top of a list of monthly indicators:
    "The committee designated June as the month of the trough based on several monthly indicators. The trough dates for these indicators are:
    Macroeconomic Advisers’ monthly GDP (June)
    The Stock-Watson index of monthly GDP (June)
    Their index of monthly GDI (July)
    An average of their two indexes of monthly GDP and GDI (June)
    Real manufacturing and trade sales (June)
    Index of Industrial Production (June)
    Real personal income less transfers (October)
    Aggregate hours of work in the total economy (October)
    Payroll survey employment (December)
    Household survey employment (December)"

    Link to the most recent report and historical data
    Background on MA's Monthly GDP


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  6. The FOMC has been edging toward consideration of a significant easing action. We suspect that the FOMC has not had a robust discussion of the threshold and implementation details for resuming LSAPs. We expect this to change next week.

    This is an excerpt from a longer commentary that is part of MA's Monetary Policy Insights Service.

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  7. The first easing action, if and when the FOMC decides to ease, will be a resumption of large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs).

    This is an excerpt from a longer commentary that is part of MA's Monetary Policy Insights Service.

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  8. • President Obama has proposed new initiatives intended to bolster the struggling economy. These include more spending on public infrastructure, tax breaks for businesses investments, and both strengthening and extending the existing credit for research and development.

    • Enactment of these proposals is far from certain, so inclusion of them in our forecast is premature.

    • Nevertheless, we find that, if implemented expeditiously, the proposals would provide a modest boost to economic growth over the next few years. They would not, however, change dramatically the qualitative characteristics of the recovery.

    • The extra stimulus would, relative to our current baseline, boost real GDP growth by an average of 0.3 over 2011 and 2012, but then subtract a few tenths from growth the following years.

    • The unemployment rate would average 0.2 lower through 2015, and inflation 0.1 higher.


    The Proposals

    Using publicly available information on these proposals we’ve pieced together this picture of the proposals.

    Infrastructure

    The Administration proposes $50 billion of appropriations for spending on improving surface transportation, airports and air traffic control. The White House suggests that this spending will be front-loaded, but without further clarification we think it prudent to assume a spend-out rate similar to that assumed by the CBO for this type of outlay. Hence, a reasonable pattern for the increments to outlays might be: $12 billion in calendar year 2011, $16 billion in 2012, $13 billion in 2013, $5 billion in 2014, and the rest spread over a few subsequent years. Hence, the spending would build in 2011 and 2012 but then reverse course and mostly dissipate by 2015.

    Expensing

    The Administration proposes expensing for eligible tangible property put in place before the end of 2011. We expect this would apply to most kinds of equipment and software, but not to non-residential buildings. The reported cost of this is $200 billion in the first year but, of course, this amount would be recouped over the subsequent life of the asset as it is only shifting the allowable deductions forward, not reducing them in total.

    Expensing may seem like a huge incentive, and it certainly can help firms that have investments to finance, but that are either cash or credit constrained. Still, the effect of this proposal is likely to be modest for several reasons. First, some investments already can be fully expensed under current law. Second, not all firms have the profits against which to charge the depreciation, and the carry-forward rules for the expensing provision have not been clarified. Third, at low interest rates the present value of the inter-temporal delay of the tax liability is relatively low. Fourth, the capital stock is currently underutilized, discouraging new investments at any cost. Fifth, the provision is for temporary expensing. Given adjustment costs for altering capital-labor ratios, investment theory suggests this will have far less impact on capital spending than would a switch to permanent expensing. And, finally, while the main effect will be to boost investment demand in 2011, that extra demand will be unwound in subsequent years.

    Research & Development Credit

    The Administration proposes to expand the R&D credit and make it permanent. The cost of roughly $10 billion a year would be covered by other measures already in the Administration’s proposed budget for fiscal year 2011. The proposal would slightly reduce the cost of capital and eliminate uncertainty over the future of the credit. However, it is very hard to measure how much extra growth would arise from any resulting innovations. In any event, our baseline forecast assumes the indefinite extension of the credit.

    Effects

    While awaiting additional details on the proposals we used our macro model to construct an initial estimate of their impact. We did this assuming that the initiatives are implemented in January of 2011 and that there is no response of monetary policy.

    The results are summarized in Charts 1 – 3, above. The new stimulus would, relative to our current baseline, boost real GDP growth by an average of 0.3 over 2011 and 2012, but then subtract a few tenths from growth the following years. The unemployment rate would average 0.2 lower through 2015, and inflation 0.1 higher. The effects are modest, and do not change materially either the qualitative character of the recovery we already are forecasting or the balance of risk surrounding that forecast.





  9. Conventional wisdom would tell you that the yield curve is pricing in a robust recovery. Our term structure model says otherwise: Current yields are consistent with expectations of a very sluggish economy.

    This is an excerpt from a longer commentary that is part of MA's Monetary Policy Insights Service.

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