1. One of the surprises in this morning’s report on second-quarter GDP growth was a huge, 28.8% annualized increase in real imports of goods and services. In a strict accounting sense, this increase subtracted 4 percentage points from GDP growth, the largest subtraction on record.

    The reason this was a surprise is related to what we view to be an underappreciated fact: real seasonally adjusted petroleum imports, as reported by Census, has a fairly strong residual seasonal component that we believe BEA adjusts out. The chart above shows the difference between annualized growth of real petroleum imports as reported by BEA and as reported by Census. The differential seasonal pattern is evident, and the differential rate of growth in the second quarter is stunning. What this means is if one is to predict growth of petroleum imports in the NIPA’s using the Census data, one needs to “seasonally adjust” the seasonally adjusted data on real petroleum imports from Census.


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  2. Until very recently, nearly all the FOMC members who have talked about quantitative easing since the June meeting have opposed it. (Boston Fed President Rosengren recently mentioned LSAPs as an “option,” but did not go as far as calling for them.) Yesterday, President Bullard, of the St. Louis Fed, became the first to indicate support for further asset purchases.

    Note: This post and the original commentary were written by former Fed governor Larry Meyer and former Fed economist Antulio Bomfim.

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  3. The minutes of the June FOMC meeting raised the prospect of further easing if the economic outlook were to deteriorate appreciably. Easing options range from language tweaks to large-scale asset purchases. Each option has its own drawbacks. Each easing option has different thresholds, but we may not be that far from the first.

    Note: This post and the original commentary were written by former Fed governor Larry Meyer and former Fed economist Antulio Bomfim.

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  4. The Chairman's prepared remarks did not deviate much from the tone of the minutes of the June FOMC meeting, not even to acknowledge the further softening in the data since that meeting. We believe that the Chairman tried hard to represent the views of the FOMC, as reflected in the minutes, but, in the process, he sounded a bit out of touch with the data released since the June meeting. On policy, his discussion seemed even less balanced than that of the minutes. It was as if he was a bit out with touch with the Committee too! The oversight committee once again mostly passed on the opportunity to pose probing questions on the conduct of monetary policy. Sadly, only 14 percent of the questions were on monetary policy. If the Chairman seemed a bit out of touch with the data, the oversight committee definitely seemed out of touch with monetary policy!

    Note: This post and the original commentary were written by former Fed governor Larry Meyer and former Fed economist Antulio Bomfim.

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  5. Any news about changes in the Chairman’s message delivered in the opening statement of the semiannual monetary policy testimony is deservedly a central focus of the markets. Still, the most amusing part of the testimony and, occasionally, even more informative than the prepared remarks, is the Q&A. Perhaps it is just wishful thinking on our part, but we thought we might try to tilt the odds towards more monetary policy questions this time around by suggesting a list of questions that members of the oversight committees should ask the Chairman. Our views on the Chairman's answers to these questions were outlined in the original commentary.

    Let's go straight to our suggested list of questions:
    • What is the probability of a double-dip recession?
    • Are you concerned about the possibility of deflation?
    • Given the FOMC’s forecast of a persistently elevated unemployment rate and very low inflation, why would there be any question about the FOMC resuming easing?
    • What is the hurdle or threshold to resume tightening?
    • What options does the Fed have should it want to ease?
    • Would any of the Committee’s easing options be able to provide meaningful additional stimulus?
    • What do you think about the direction of the financial regulatory legislation to remove the Fed’s authority over consumer protection?
    • Do you worry about the adverse and potentially dangerous consequences of keeping rates so low for a very long time?
    • Do you believe that it is wise for a Fed Chairman to meet with the President and subsequently participate in a press conference with the President in which the President lays out part of his political agenda and indicates that these are points of agreement between himself and the Fed Chairman?
    • Do you believe that financial stability should be an explicit third mandate for the Federal Reserve?
    Note: This post and the original commentary were written by former Fed governor Larry Meyer and former Fed economist Antulio Bomfim.

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  6. We don't expect the Chairman to reveal much news when he delivers the semiannual Monetary Policy Testimony next week. The policy discussion will be more balanced, not just about exit.

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  7. The FOMC modestly downgraded its take on the strength of the recovery. The main change in the Committee's assessment of the outlook was in its views of the balance of risks.

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  8. The outlook theme conveyed in the minutes was one more of continuity than change: a modest recovery, a gradual decline in the unemployment rate, and subdued inflation. Still, the end result was less focus on exit issues and a shift to a more balanced discussion of policy.

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  9. Monthly GDP rose 0.1% in May, following a 0.2% decline in April. The roughly flat profile for monthly GDP over April and May follows average monthly gains of 0.5% per month over the prior three months. The modest increase in May reflected positive contributions from domestic final sales and inventory investment that were nearly offset by a decline in net exports. Monthly GDP in May was 1.6% above the first-quarter average at an annual rate. Our latest tracking estimate of 2.1% growth of GDP in the second quarter assumes a 0.5% increase in monthly GDP in June.




    Monthly GDP Index: Short View


    Monthly GDP Index: Long View


    Contributions to Annualized %ch (approx)


    Contributions to Annualized %ch (approx)



    Link to the May Report and historical data
    Background on MA's Monthly GDP
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    • Since the start of the week incoming data have led us to revise down our estimate of Q2 GDP growth from 3.2% to just 2.1%.[1] Revisions to our GDP tracking estimate of this magnitude inside of a week are rare, and we cannot help but react with some concern to this downward revision.
    • Fortunately, our estimate that domestic final demand posted a quite solid gain over the quarter remains intact. We expect final sales to domestic purchasers to rise at a solidly above-trend 3.9% rate in the second quarter. We have been highlighting the need for the growth of domestic final demand to firm significantly from the lackluster pace over the second half of last year to a substantially above-trend pace around the middle of this year. Thus, we are encouraged that the downward revision to our GDP growth estimate has not adversely affected this component.
    • We are not inclined to view this downward revision to Q2 GDP growth as a prelude to meaningful additional weakness in subsequent quarters. The fact that the bulk of the downward revision to GDP growth resulted from much stronger-than-expected growth of imports eases somewhat our concern about subsequent quarters. Clearly domestic demand growth is strong and sucking in imports.
    • Nevertheless, weaker growth of GDP, by itself, would imply less momentum in income and at least somewhat softer GDP growth in subsequent quarters. Our concern in this regard is tempered, however, because data on hours and employment through June have already been reported, and are incorporated into our estimate of Q2 personal income.

    Sources of the Downward Revision:
    • Stronger than expected growth of imports in May led to a sharp upward revision to our estimate of second-quarter import growth from 10.4% to 19.3%, annualized. Exports came in about as expected. The change to our estimate of real net exports for the second quarter was -$39 billion, more than accounting for a 0.8 percentage point downward revision to our Q2 GDP growth estimate.
    • Core retail sales for June were only slightly weaker than expected, but with revisions to prior months, this resulted in a 0.4pp downward revision to our forecast of Q2 PCE growth. This resulted in a 0.2pp downward revision to Q2 GDP growth.
    • Total business inventories were slightly weaker than had been expected and led to a 0.1pp downward revision to our forecast of Q2 GDP growth.
    [1] See “Current-Quarter GDP Tracking: Second Quarter 2010” July 14, 2010, for additional details.

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