The Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of Economic Research has yet to call an official end to the recession that began in December of 2007, but most forecasters (and at least one outspoken member of the Committee, Bob Gordon) now believe the recession ended around the middle of 2009. We believe the recession ended in either June or July, so that the economy has been expanding for about a year.

Early in the recovery many forecasters, concerned that the nascent expansion was fueled only by temporary inventory dynamics and short-lived fiscal stimulus, fretted over the possibility of a double-dip recession. Now, with the emergence of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, that concern has re-surfaced. Certainly we recognize that the debt crisis imparts some downside risk to our baseline forecast for GDP growth. However, based on current, high-frequency data — most of which is financial in nature and so is not subject to revision — we believe the chance of a double-dip recession is small.

One way we assess these odds is with a simple but empirically useful “recession probability model” in which the probability of experiencing a recession month within the coming year is a weighted sum of the probability that the economy already is in recession and the probability that a recession will begin within a year. The former probability is estimated as a function of the term slope of interest rates, stock prices, payroll employment, personal income, and industrial production. The latter is estimated as a function of the term slope, stock prices, credit spreads, bank lending conditions, oil prices, and the unemployment rate. Currently this model, updated through May’s data, estimates that the probability of another recession month occurring within the coming year is zero. (See Chart).

While ex post this model has a perfect record of predicting recessions, ex ante its predictions are only one factor we weigh when considering whether to introduce a double-dip recession into our baseline forecast. Still, the extremely low current reading is in notable contrast to readings during the early phase of the sub-prime crisis when the probability of recession flirted with 50% for a year before then finally rising strongly above that marker during the second half of 2007. At least by this measure, the economy appears to be in a less vulnerable position now than it was then.


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  1. We've finally moved our blog over to our primary domain.

    We'll be updating the MA blog a lot more frequently now.

    Please visit us at macroadvisers.com.

  2. Monthly GDP rose 0.3% in January on the heels of a sharp, 1.0% increase in December. The January increase was more than doubly accounted for by a large increase in nonfarm inventory investment. Final sales declined in January, primarily reflecting declines in net exports, capital goods, and construction; PCE rose in January. The level of GDP in January was 4.4% above the fourth-quarter average at an annual rate. Implicit in our latest tracking forecast of 2.7% GDP growth in the first quarter is a 0.8% (monthly rate) decline in February that mainly reflects our assumption that nonfarm inventory investment stalls then.

    This is from a commentary that was published on March 14, 2013.



      

    Technical Note
    Macroeconomic Advisers’ index of Monthly GDP (MGDP) is a monthly indicator of real aggregate output that is conceptually consistent with real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the NIPA’s. The consistency is derived from two sources. First, MGDP is calculated using much of the same underlying monthly source data that is used in the calculation of GDP. Second, the method of aggregation to arrive at MGDP is similar to that for official GDP. Growth of MGDP at the monthly frequency is determined primarily by movements in the underlying monthly source data, and growth of MGDP at the quarterly frequency is nearly identical to growth of real GDP.


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  3. There was a lot to like in this morning's report on the employment situation in February.

    • Nonfarm payroll employment rose 236 thousand, well above expectations.
    • The unemployment rate declined two-tenths to 7.7%.
    • The hours index rose five-tenths, reflecting both a solid increase in private employment (246 thousand) and an increase in the workweek.
    • The breadth of the strength in employment was encouraging.  Of note was a 48 thousand increase in construction employment, which was the largest one-month gain since early 2007.

    This morning's report is indicative of an improving trend in payroll gains and a healthy dose of momentum early in the year.

    • Over the last 4 months, payroll gains have averaged 205 thousand per month.
    • This is up from gains averaging 154 thousand per month over the prior 4 months.
    • The large gain in employment in February suggests a bit more positive momentum in the economy than was generally appreciated.

    The implications for the near-term outlook were positive, but modest.

    • While employment and hours in February far exceeded expectations, revisions to previous months were not favorable in terms of their implications for Q1 growth -- growth of employee hours in December was revised up and growth in January was revised down.
    • Combined with unexpected weakness in the hours of the self-employed, this suggests an upward revision to our forecast for growth of hours worked in the nonfarm business sector in the first quarter of only two tenths (to 1.8%).
    • Average hourly earnings posted a trend-like, 0.2% increase in February.  Combined with the unexpected strength in hours, this suggests a few tenths more growth of wage and salary income in the first quarter than we previously expected. 
    • This, in turn, translates into modest upside risk to our latest forecast of 1.6% PCE growth in the first quarter, but not enough to warrant a tracking update.

    There are other reasons not to get carried away.

    • While this morning's employment report was unexpected and encouraging, it's important to keep in mind that the effects of this year's tax increase and sequester have yet to be felt fully.
    • To be sure, payroll gains in line with the recent trend (about 200 thousand per month) would put the labor market on a healthy trajectory.
    • However, we expect that fiscal drag now coming on line should soften the trend in payroll employment over the next few months, so we expect the pace of employment gains to slow relative to the trend of the last few months.

    This is from a commentary that was published on March 8, 2013.  

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  5. In this latest edition of our annual commentary, we look at how FOMC members moved markets last year.
    • In a departure from previous years, we examine the impact of FOMC participants' speeches on the ten-year Treasury yield (instead of the two-year yield).
    • The two-year yield today is pinned down by the FOMC's very explicit funds rate guidance, which suggests no rate hikes over the next two years.
    • The combination of the funds rate guidance and very low yields has left very little room for the two-year yield to respond to FOMC speeches.
    The "I Moved Markets" award goes to the FOMC member who had the greatest total impact on the ten-year yield.
    • And the winner is: Chairman Bernanke! On a cumulative basis, he moved the ten-year yield by 18 basis points.
    • The two runners-up were Presidents Lockhart and Fisher. President Bullard, last year's winner in a rare upset, virtually tied for fourth place with President Dudley.
    The "Power Player of the Year" award goes to the FOMC member with the largest market impact per speech.
    • Some FOMC members speak more often than others and thus have more opportunities to move the market.
    • For instance, President Fisher had by far the largest number of speeches included in our analysis (22).
    • On a per-speech basis, the Chairman also came in first. President Lockhart was the runner-up, with President Lacker third.
    The "Market Neutrality" award goes to the member who managed to most consistently talk about monetary policy without affecting market prices.
    • This award goes to the entire Board of Governors (other than the Chairman).
    • Governors spoke little compared to the rest of the Committee and had a net impact of only -1/2 basis point.
    For all the attention paid to speeches, official FOMC communications, such as FOMC meeting minutes and statements, were far more influential to the market than speeches (on a per-event basis).
    • On a per-event basis the impact of speeches on the ten-year yield was less than one-third that of FOMC minutes and statements.
    • Minutes, statements, and the Chairman's press briefings were more influential on markets than speeches by the Chairman.

    Every year we write a special issue of our Fixed Income Focus series devoted to gauging the market impact of Fed speeches and other forms of communications. We rank FOMC members according to the effects of their speeches on interest rates. This year, we used the same methodology as in previous years with one notable exception: We look at the ten-year Treasury yield rather than the two-year Treasury yield. The two-year yield has been pinned down by the FOMC's increasingly explicit funds-rate guidance that, we would argue, has made the two-year yield less responsive to Fed speeches. In contrast, one could argue that the ten-year yield has become more sensitive to Fed speeches given that QE tends to have a greater impact on the longer end of the curve.

    We examine the market effects not only of speeches, but also of television and radio broadcast interviews. For simplicity, however, unless otherwise noted, we refer to all individual communications by members as speeches-except the Chairman's semiannual monetary policy testimonies before Congress and his post-meeting press conferences.[1]

    We consider only those speeches that have at least some forward-looking content on monetary policy or the economic outlook. We measure the market impact of a speech as the change in the ten-year Treasury yield over a window that normally begins 15 minutes before and ends two hours after the speech. When economic data releases or Treasury auctions interfere with this 2-1/4-hour window, we either adjust the window or exclude the speech. This helps us better isolate the market impact of the speeches included in our analysis.[2] We generally exclude speeches with coinciding start times.

    We also look at the market impact of official FOMC communications, such as FOMC statements and minutes. We include the Chairman's semiannual monetary policy testimonies and press conferences in the FOMC communications category because these are events where the Chairman is effectively speaking on behalf of the Committee.

    Market Reaction to Speeches by Individual FOMC Members
    Figure 1 shows the sum of the absolute value of the impact on the ten-year Treasury yield of each member's public speeches. Chairman Bernanke tops the list with a total impact of 18 basis points. President Lockhart came in second place with an impact of 17 basis points, and President Fisher was third with about 16 basis points. The previous year's winner, President Bullard, came in virtually tied for fourth place with President Dudley.

    With the exception of the Chairman, the most impactful speakers last year were all Bank presidents. The greater market impact of presidents is not at all surprising. First, the Board acts as a team, and teams follow the leader.[3] As such, governors are more reluctant to take positions in public that differ from those of the Chairman. Governors more often clarify the view of the FOMC rather than question it. To us, this implies that governors' speeches are less likely to generate "news" than presidents' speeches. Second, only a few members of the Board, especially for the current Board, have a background that makes them comfortable talking about the outlook and monetary policy. So governors not only tend to make less news, they also tend to talk less often than presidents.

    Who Talked the Most
    Figure 2 shows, for each member, the total number of speeches that were included in our database for 2012. Overall, we examined 133 speeches by FOMC members: 116 speeches by presidents, 12 by the Chairman, and 5 by other Board members. President Fisher had the most speeches included in our analysis (22), close to his 2011 total of 21. President Bullard was second with 14, although he likely holds the record with 36 speeches in 2010. Chairman Bernanke came in tied for fourth. As we indicated above, other governors spoke relatively infrequently. Vice Chair Yellen, the most frequent speaker other than the Chairman, gave only two monetary policy-relevant speeches last year.[4]

    The new Board members, Governors Powell and Stein, followed Board tradition and stayed below the radar, speaking little publicly. Governor Stein did give some more-theoretical but still policy-relevant speeches on asset purchases toward the end of the year. We were able to include one of those speeches in our sample.
    Market Response Per Speech
    The results in Figure 1 do not account for the fact that some FOMC members speak more often than others and, thus, have more opportunities to affect market prices. Figure 3 presents the average absolute market response per speech for FOMC members. The average market impact per speech by presidents was about 0.9 basis point; the average market impact of governors, other than the Chairman, was a third as great, at 0.3 basis point. This is consistent with our observation above about presidents' greater propensity, relative to Governors other than the Chairman, to deliver market-impacting speeches.

    Chairman Bernanke had the largest impact per speech, 1.5 basis points, followed by President Lockhart at 1.3 basis points. President Lockhart is considered a centrist and perhaps his remarks are closely scrutinized by the market for signs of where the Committee's consensus might be headed. President Lacker, who dissented at every meeting in 2012 and consistently pushed back against the center-dove coalition, led the rest of the pack on an impact-per-speech basis. President Fisher, the most frequent FOMC speaker last year, was not very impactful on a per-speech basis.

    Directional Bias and “Market Neutrality”
    We also examined the net directional effect of each FOMC member on Treasury yields, measured as the sum of the market impact of his or her speeches. On net, FOMC speeches increased yields by about 11 basis points in 2012. This suggests that last year's speeches tended to be interpreted as more hawkish than expected. Of course, what matters for the market response is the extent to which each speech surprises relative to market expectations. So, even a hawkish speech by a hawk can drive yields lower if the speech is less hawkish than anticipated. A case in point is President Plosser, a solid hawk whose speeches apparently contributed to a 6-basis-point decline in the ten-year yield. Closer to the other end of the spectrum, President Dudley's speeches were apparently seen as less dovish than anticipated, adding 5 basis points to the ten-year yield last year, on net.

    The Chairman had the greatest negative cumulative impact on yields, -6 basis points. This is not surprising because the FOMC was easing in 2012. President Bullard had the greatest positive cumulative impact, 7-1/2 basis points.

    Some members on the Committee-typically governors other than the Chairman-pride themselves on having a very small impact on markets. In effect, they choose not to compete for the "I Moved Markets" award. In recognition of these members, we offer the "Market Neutrality" award, which of course goes to the FOMC member with the least net impact on the markets. But in 2012 a number of governors had zero net impact on the ten-year yield. So, in a departure from tradition, we give that award to "the governors" (excluding the Chairman). As a group, they had a net impact of only -1/2 basis point, though we should point out that the market neutrality of three of the governors (Duke, Powell, and Tarullo) simply reflects that we were able to include none of their speeches.

    Impact of FOMC “Official” Communications on Yields in 2012
    Figure 5 compares the market impact in 2012 of official communications by the Committee-statements, minutes, press conferences, and the Chairman's monetary policy testimonies-to the market impact of speeches. The figure suggests that, for all the attention and press coverage devoted to speeches in general, on a per-event basis, official FOMC communications were far more market influential than speeches last year.

    Not even the Chairman's speeches were more influential than official communications. For instance, the average market impact of his speeches (see Figure 3) was around half that of FOMC statements.

    In 2012, FOMC statements had the largest impact per event, 3-1/2 basis points. Next came the FOMC meeting minutes and the Chairman's press briefings, at around 3 basis points, followed by the Chairman's monetary policy testimonies, at 2-3/4 basis points.[5] The substantial impact of the minutes and press briefings may reflect that these proved to be excellent guides to the evolving Committee consensus in 2012, often providing the first signals of an emerging consensus.

    [1] By "members," we mean all Board Governors (including the Chairman) and all Federal Reserve Bank presidents, including those who did not vote last year.
    [2] Of course, we are aware that many other factors, including noise, drive fluctuations in yields. Our assumption here is that they average out to zero during the measurement window, such that we attribute the full movement in the ten-year yield within the window to the news element in the speech.
    [3] See our Policy Focus commentary, "Counting Heads: Does it Matter?" July 1, 2010, for a discussion of the voting behavior of governors.
    [4] As noted previously, we had to exclude a large number of speeches from our analysis because they happened to be scheduled for roughly the same time as another speech or market-moving event.
    [5] Note that the FOMC's projections are released in the Summary of Economic Projections just before the press conference, so it is hard to disentangle the effects of the two events.

    This is from a commentary that was published on March 8, 2013.

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  6. The Fed has been posting outsized profits in recent years and remitting them to the U.S. Treasury.

    This is from a commentary that was published on February 22, 2013.

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  7. A sequestration of federal spending, scheduled to take effect on March 1, is now less than two weeks away.  Little progress has been made in negotiating a bargain that avoids or delays the automatic spending cuts implied by the sequestration.[1] Accordingly, we now put the odds of a sequestration at close to 50%, and rising.
    • Our baseline forecast, which shows GDP growth of 2.6% in 2013 and 3.3% in 2014, does not include the sequestration.
    • The sequestration would reduce our forecast of growth during 2013 by 0.6 percentage point (to 2.0%) but then, assuming investors expect the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) to delay raising the federal funds rate, boost growth by 0.1 percentage point (to 3.4%) in 2014.
    • By the end of 2014, the sequestration would cost roughly 700,000 jobs (including reductions in armed forces), pushing the civilian unemployment rate up ¼ percentage point, to 7.4%.  The higher unemployment would linger for several years.
    The macroeconomic impact of the sequestration is not catastrophic.  Nevertheless, the indiscriminate fiscal restraint would come on the heels of tax increases in the first quarter that total nearly $200 billion, with the economy still struggling to overcome the legacy of the Great Recession, and when the FOMC is constrained in its ability to offset the additional fiscal drag with a more accommodative monetary policy.  By far the preferable policy is a credible long-term plan to shrink the deficit more slowly through some combination of revenue increases within broad tax reform, more carefully considered cuts in discretionary spending, and fundamental reform of entitlement programs.

    Background
    The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA) established separate caps on defense and nondefense spending for fiscal years 2012-2021, while also creating the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction charged with proposing an additional $1.2 trillion of deficit reduction relative to budget projections based on the cap that was to be enacted, by January 15, 2012.
    [2] Failure of the Committee was to trigger, effective January 1, 2013, “automatic” cuts in spending of roughly $110 billion per year relative

    to the caps, with the cuts split equally between defense and nondefense outlays.  For 2013, the reductions were to be implemented by cancelling budget authority in a process called “sequestration.”  For subsequent years, the cuts were to be achieved by adjusting downward the original caps.  The Committee did in fact fail, starting a year-long countdown to the sequestration.  The recently enacted American Tax Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA) made slight adjustments to the original spending caps enacted under BCA, reduced the size of the sequestration in 2013 by $24 billion (from $109 billion to $85 billion), and delayed its implementation until  March 1.  That day is now imminent.

    Sizing the Sequestration
    Table 1 and Chart 1, which are based on estimates prepared by the Congressional Budget Office, show the effect of the sequestration on both federal budget authority and federal outlays for fiscal years 2013-2023 relative to projections based on the spending caps.
    [3] For purposes of assessing the impact of the sequestration on the economic outlook, our focus is on outlays as opposed to authority.  Note that the full impact of the sequestration on the level of outlays—roughly $110 billion—is not reached for several years, because the sequestration for 2013 was reduced and cuts in outlays lag behind cuts in budget authority.
     


    Designing the Alternative Scenario
    MA’s current baseline forecast does not include the sequestration.
    [4] Rather, it assumes the sequestration is avoided and replaced with a long and gradual squeeze on spending that is less damaging to near-term economic growth and delays a significant part of the fiscal contraction until later in the decade when the FOMC is better positioned to offset the fiscal drag with accommodative monetary policy.

    To use our macro model (MA/US) to simulate the potential effects of the sequestration on our forecast, it is first necessary to convert and interpolate the spending cuts shown in Table 1 from fiscal years to calendar quarters and then allocate those spending cuts across the components of federal expenditures in the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs) that are the basis for the government sector in MA/US.

    This allocation does affect the results because cuts in different components of the federal budget affect the economy differently.  For example, a reduction in federal purchases of goods reduces GDP directly but (private) employment only indirectly, while a cut in federal employment reduces GDP and public employment directly and then private employment indirectly.  In addition, the fiscal “multiplier” is higher for direct purchases than it is for payments such as subsidies or foreign aid.

    The results of this allocation through 2015 are shown in Table 2.  Cuts in NIPA consumption and gross investment account for roughly two-thirds of the savings, with transfers and grants comprising the rest.  About one-third of the cuts in transfers and grants are in Medicare benefits.
    [5]   

    Simulation Results
    We layered these spending cuts on top of our baseline assumptions and re-simulated MA/US allowing the model’s endogenous response of monetary policy.  The results for growth and unemployment are summarized in Charts 2 and 3; details of the baseline and alternative simulations are shown in the tables at the back of the report. 




    The effect of the sequestration is to slow real GDP growth over 2013 from 2.6% to 2.0%.  The largest impact occurs in the second quarter, when growth is reduced by roughly 1¼ percentage points.  By the end of the year, the civilian unemployment rate is ¼ percentage point higher than in the baseline.  As early as the first quarter of 2014, GDP growth exceeds the baseline path, albeit slightly.  The reason growth rebounds so quickly is that while, relative to the baseline, spending does continue falling modestly in 2014 and 2015, slower economic growth and higher unemployment lead financial markets to expect a later (2016:Q1 instead of 2015:H2) tightening of monetary policy.  This lowers long-term yields roughly enough to just offset additional fiscal drag in 2014.  However, because GDP growth does not exceed the baseline by much in 2014, the increase in unemployment lingers for several years.  

    Concluding Remarks
    The impact of the sequestration would not be a macroeconomic catastrophe.  Nevertheless, the indiscriminate fiscal restraint would occur on the heels of tax increases that total nearly $200 billion in the first quarter, with the economy still struggling to overcome the legacy of the Great Recession, and when the FOMC is constrained in its ability to offset the additional fiscal restraint.  Furthermore, spending cuts that are so arbitrary in their allocation and timing can’t possibly be optimal from a public policy perspective. The preferable policy is a credible long-term plan to shrink the deficit more slowly through some combination of tax increases within broad tax reform, more carefully considered cuts in discretionary spending, and fundamental reform of entitlement programs.


    [1] Democrats have proposed replacing the first 10 months of the sequestration with a combination of tax increases and spending cuts that would accumulate to roughly $110 billion over ten years.  The proposal would raise revenue by imposing the so-called “Buffet rule,” limiting tax breaks for oil companies, and penalizing companies that outsource jobs.  It would cut both defense spending and nondefense domestic outlays by $27.5 billion over 10 years.  Republicans appear unimpressed by the proposal and, at least for now, many in the GOP seem content to let the sequestration play out.
    [2] The caps applied to spending other than outlays related to operations, both military (defense) and diplomatic (nondefense), in Afghanistan and also allowed “carve-outs” for spending on emergencies and disaster relief.  In addition, cuts to Medicare benefits were limited to 2%. 
    [3] Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2013 to 2023 (February 2013).
    [4] Please see Macroeconomic Advisers’ Outlook Commentary (Volume 31, Number 1; February 15, 2013).

    [5] The sequester does not apply to the benefits of either the Social Security or the Medicaid programs, and cuts in Medicare benefits are capped at 2% of the baseline level. We allocated the defense sequester proportionately across all components of  NIPA defense expenditures and the nondefense sequester proportionately across all components of NIPA nondefense expenditures except Social Security benefits and Medicaid transfers to states, while observing the limit on cuts to Medicare benefits.  In addition, we assumed that reductions in grants to states are matched by reductions in state and local expenditures on goods and services other than compensation.


    This is from a commentary that was published on February 19, 2013.

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  8. Monthly GDP rose 1.0% in December following a 0.2% increase in November that was revised up by two-tenths. Three-fourths of the December increase was accounted for by a sharp narrowing of the trade deficit in December; a solid contribution from domestic final sales accounted for most of the rest. The level of GDP in December was 2.8% above the fourth-quarter average at an annual rate, indicating some upside risk to our Consensus Panel’s (mean) forecast of first-quarter GDP growth of 1.9% (as of last Friday). Our latest tracking forecast of 2.4% GDP growth in the first quarter assumes little change in monthly GDP over the three months of the first quarter.

    This is from a commentary that was published on February 14, 2013.




    Technical Note
    Macroeconomic Advisers’ index of Monthly GDP (MGDP) is a monthly indicator of real aggregate output that is conceptually consistent with real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the NIPA’s. The consistency is derived from two sources. First, MGDP is calculated using much of the same underlying monthly source data that is used in the calculation of GDP. Second, the method of aggregation to arrive at MGDP is similar to that for official GDP. Growth of MGDP at the monthly frequency is determined primarily by movements in the underlying monthly source data, and growth of MGDP at the quarterly frequency is nearly identical to growth of real GDP.



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  9. Yesterday Governor Stein provided a thought-provoking assessment of the credit market as a potential source of financial instability.

    We see Governor Stein's remarks as consistent with the themes we developed in our most recent Rates Outlook commentary, published earlier this week.

    This is from a commentary that was published on February 8, 2013.

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  10. Contact Macroeconomic Advisers
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